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REVIVING THE RHETORIC OF
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CHOIR
DIRECTORS, COPY MACHINES,
AND NEW ARRANGEMENTS
OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MUSIC
PAUL I. HEALDt
INTRODUCTION
Professor Peter Jaszi recently issued a challenge to those con-
cerned about growing threats to the public domain.' According to
Jaszi, advocates of a broadly accessible and easily usable public
domain must develop a new rhetoric by exploring alternative ways
of speaking about the values they espouse.2 It is time for such a
challenge-arch-protectionists are on the march, determined to re-
capture works from the public domain for their private benefit,3
t Baritone, Saint Gregory the Great Episcopal Church Choir, Athens, Georgia. As-
sociate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., 1988, University of
Chicago. Many thanks to my musically talented friends Jill Crandall, Kevin Kelly, Chuck
Beaudrot, Esq., and Mark Schweizer, and to Jim Brinson, Director of the 45th Annual
Sewanee Church Music conference, for letting me present a version of this paper to an
audience of choir directors whose comments were invaluable. Thanks also for the insight-
ful comments of those whose professional lives revolve around the law: Wendy Gordon,
Chris Kelly, Jessica Litman, Shira Perlmutter, David Seidman, David Wolfsolm, Esq.,
D.M.A., and Fred Yen.
1. See Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature)
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law,
Address at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Convention (Jan. 7, 1996),
in 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996). Professor Jaszi specifically mentioned as a
threat recent legislation restoring copyright protection to certain foreign works, thus re-
moving them from the public domain. See id. at 606-07 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(g)
(1994)).
2. Jaszi concludes that "defenders of the public interest must begin to develop evi-
dence and arguments that function, at least to some extent, independently of the specific
terms of the Patent and Copyright Clause, and carry on the work of explaining why and
to whom the public domain matters." Id. at 611.
3. For evidence of this trend, see 17 U.S.C. § 104A(g); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c)
(1976) (extending the term of copyright from 28 years with a 28-year renewal right, to
the life of the author plus 50 years). Proposed legislation would further extend protection
to the life of the author plus 70 years. See Songwriters Want Copyright in Tune with
Laws Overseas; Adding 20 Years Would Bolster Economy, Backers Say, WASH. TMESs,
Nov. 1, 1995, at A2. Advocates of consumer interests have combined forces to fight
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and the old ways of advocating the public interest can no longer
be counted on to carry the day. *The public has demonstrated little
understanding of the nature of the public domain and, unlike the
publishing industry, has shown little ability to effectively protect its
interest. As a remedy, Jaszi suggests that scholarly commentators
bear the burden of explaining why the public domain is so impor-
tant.
4
Several perceptive explorations of the public domain have
already appeared.' Although these articles provide a theoretical
framework for protecting the public domain, a focus on the partic-
ular rather than the general might better effect the rhetorical
move proposed by Jaszi. Given "the natural tendency of legal
rights to express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of
all else,"6 perhaps the best way to defend the public domain is to
demonstrate its particular importance to those who draw from it.
To this end, we will enter the world of the choir director and con-
duct a case study in the public domain.
A confused choir director recently showed me a version of
the William Billings anthem "Jordan" published in 1954,1 pointed
to the bottom of the page, and asked me how the work of a com-
poser who has been dead for almost 200 years could remain copy-
certain aspects of the Clinton Administration's "White Paper," a policy statement on
intellectual property and the Internet written by the National Information Infrastructure
Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. The White Paper is widely
viewed as advocating the expansion of the current scope of copyright protection in favor
of publishers. For a discussion, see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights and the
Global Information Economy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 23, 24 (1996) ("[I]f the public
can be brought to understand how substantial a change is being sought, the White Paper
may get the quick funeral it deserves.").
4. Professors who teach copyright law have recently collaborated on a series of
amicus briefs in major copyright cases and have consistently taken the side of the con-
sumer, the copier, and the public interest against that of well-organized corporate enter-
prises. See ag., Pamela Samuelson, Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 3 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 103 (1995) (re-
printing amicus brief in support of respondent in the Borland case, 116 S. Ct. 804
(1996)).
5. See, ag., Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intel-
lectual Property and the Public Domain (pts. 1 & 2), 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1,
191 (1994-95); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Indi-
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
6. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13
(1984) (commenting on intellectual property rights and rejecting the expansion of copy-
right liability for video piracy to sellers of VCRs).
7. Reproduced as Appendix B2.
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righted A glance at the sheet music revealed a copyright symbol.
My snappy and not entirely helpful answer was that a sufficiently
original arrangement or edition of a public domain composition is
entitled to protection by copyright law.9 She then presented me
with a copy of the original version of "Jordan,"1 long in the
public domain, and asked me to identify the differences between
the two works." Her critical follow-up question: could she photo-
copy the 1954 publication and distribute it to her choir? In other
words, did the copyright symbol on the piece have any legal
force? While her question in the case of "Jordan" was academic
(since the public domain work was in her other hand), the legal
status of recent versions of public domain music is, in general, ex-
tremely important to choir directors: original versions of the music
they seek are usually very difficult to obtain.'2
Although most published opinions discussing arrangements of
public domain music suggest that the 1954 publication of "Jordan"
is not sufficiently original to be protected by copyright, and there-
fore is probably amenable to the photocopy machine, the parame-
ters of the applicable legal standard are hazy. 3 A recent case
finds that, to be protected by copyright, a new arrangement of
pre-existing work must contain more than "cocktail pianist varia-
tions .... [S]omething of substance [must be] added making the
piece to some extent a new work with the old song embedded in
it."' 4 Another, older case holds that "inconsequential melodic and
8. William Billings (1746-1800) was one of first great American composers of choral
music. His works remain popular today. See THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE HYMNAL
1982: 2 HYMNS ACCOMPANIMENT EDrION (1985). The publication of his complete works
in 1986 marked the first edition of the complete works of any American composer. See
James Haar, Forward to 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM BILLINGS at ix (Karl
Kroeger ed., 1986).
9. A musical arrangement is a "derivative work." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). An
original derivative work is copyrightable. See iL § 103. The standard of originality re-
quired is discussed infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. All works published more
than 75 years ago are considered to be in the public domain and may be copied by any-
one without the permission of the author or her estate. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)(1)(A)
(1994). For a discussion of music and the public domain, see M. WILLIAM KRASLOVSKY
& SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 259-67 (7th ed. 1995).
10. See Appendix B1. The piece was first published in 1786. See 3 Ti COMPLETE
WORKS OF WILLIAM BILLINGS, supra note 8, at 137, and infra notes 140-46 and accom-
panying text.
11. Compare Appendix B1 with Appendix B2.
12. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
14. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) [hereinafter Woods
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harmonic embellishments such as are frequently improvised by any
competent musician" are not sufficiently original to earn copyright
protection for an arrangement of a public domain work.'5 An-
other opinion suggests, however, that the addition of new "fin-
gering, dynamic marks, tempo indications, slurs and phrasing" can
be enough. 6
None of the cases that discuss this issue provide an appendix
that allows the reader to compare the public domain version of a
composition with the allegedly original, derivative arrangement.
The articulated tests, described as the "mere mechanic" test, 7 the
"substantiality" test, 8 and the "distinguishable variation" test,9
are too vague in and of themselves to resolve disputes. The lack
of visual comparisons and the limited precedential value of the
relevant opinions' ° complicates the choir director's determination
of whether she can photocopy an arrangement of public domain
music or must purchase multiple copies of the work.
The decision to photocopy or not to photocopy has significant
consequences for the music consumer's pocketbook. Photocopies
1] (holding that seven arrangements of "When the Red, Red Robin Comes Bob-Bob-
Bobbin' Along" were not sufficiently original derivative works to be immune from an
attempt by the composer's estate to exercise the § 304 (17 U.S.C.) termination right),
affd in part and rev'd in part, Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 991 (2d Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Woods 11. The court assumed, as does this Article, that the same standard
should be used to judge the originality of public domain compositions and arrangements
of protected music. See id. at 990-93.
15. See McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
16. Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17,
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17. See Ronald P. Smith, Arrangements and Editions of Public Domain Music: Origi-
nality in a Finite System, 34 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 104, 108-14 (1983) (noting cases that
deny protection to arrangements derived by the mechanical application of general music
principles). See id. at 111 (classifying McIntyre, 166 F. Supp. 681, as a "mere mechanic"
case). Woods If also applies this test, emphasizing that "'the requirement of originality
[cannot] be satisfied simply by the demonstration of "physical skill" or "special train-
ing.""' 60 F.3d at 990 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d
Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
18. See Smith, supra note 17, at 115-20 (identifying opinions that require a "substan-
tial" difference between the original and the arrangement) (citing Wood v. 'Boosey, 3
L.R.-Q.B. 223, 230 (1868) (piano reduction of operatic score contained enough substantial
differences to be a "new and separate work")).
19. See id. at 122 (noting that some cases require that "derivations of public domain
works need only represent a 'distinguishable variation' to warrant protection") (citing
Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). Consoli-
dated Music, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, would probably fall in this group.
20. Almost all the decisions are from federal district courts. See, e.g., supra notes 14-
16, 19.
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cost around three cents per page,21 while an original printed ver-
sion of a choral work costs about thirty cents per page.' The
expense of buying rather than copying public domain sheet music
is directly absorbed by the taxpayers who fund music education in
public schools, the church congregations who must raise money for
the church music budget, and the patrons of the fine arts who
finance music ensembles with their admission fees or donations.'
To recognize the high cost of sheet music is not to assert that
legitimately registered works should be pirated at the copy ma-
chine. The point is that the decision to purchase rather than to
photocopy is a costly one, that as consumers, taxpayers, and
churchgoers we are directly affected when the decision to purchase
is made unnecessarily. Arrangements of public domain music not
sufficiently original to be protected by copyright law are free to
all, 24 yet, much to our financial detriment, the law does not suffi-
ciently identify exactly which of these arrangements are fair game.
Music publishers, taking advantage of this uncertainty, intimi-
date the public into buying what they already own by affixing
copyright symbols to virtually all public domain music as well as
trivially different arrangements of public domain music. Publish-
ers
change titles without modifying lyrics or melody. They may claim
full originality when they are really only "finders" of public do-
21. Telephone Interview with Annette Hicks, Parish Administrator, Saint Gregory the
Great Episcopal Church, Athens, GA (Nov. 27, 1996). In Athens, McCopy's currently
charges four cents per page.
22. This estimate based on an informal survey of anthems offered for sale by Vester
Music at the 45th Annual Sewanee Church Music Conference, July 9-16, 1995.
23. For an illustration from just one relevant market, assume that 100,000 twenty-
member church choirs in the United States sing at least six public domain arrangements
per year and the average length of each work is five pages. The decision to buy new
sheet music for those performances (100,000 choirs x 20 choristers x 6 anthems x 5
pages x $.30 (cost of each piece of sheet music) = $18 million) as opposed to photocopy-
ing (100,000 x 20 x 6 x 5 x $.03 (copy cost) = $1.8 million) implicates a substantial sum
($16.2 million), all of which comes at the expense of other church programs. Given that
far more than 100,000 churches have choirs of more than twenty (mailing addresses col-
lected in a database sold by American Church U.S.A. list more than 345,000 churches in
the United States), and given the popularity of public domain church music by Bach,
Brahms, Billings, etc. (to name just some of the B's), $162 million would seem to be a
gross underestimation. And this figure does not take into account taxpayers' money spent
to finance public performances by private groups or on sheet music for music programs
in the millions of public educational institutions around the country.
24. See, e.g., Appendices A2, B2, and C2.
25. See id.
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main songs. They register copyrights to such songs, claiming they
are "original" works, and fail to set forth accurately the limited
amount of any new material. They thereby falsely and unfairly
obtain the benefit of the Copyright Act provision that places on
an unauthorized user the burden to prove the invalidity of a
certificate of copyright registration.26
This Article, in response to Professor Jaszi's challenge, uses the
particular experience of a choir director and visual comparisons of
public domain and "copyrighted" works to inquire into the stan-
dard that governs the copyrightability of musical arrangements
and, at the same time, to strengthen the voice of the public do-
main.
I. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES AND
INTRODUCTION TO THE RELEVANT LAW
The law governing arrangements of public domain music can
perhaps be explained best in light of the policies that animate the
Copyright Act.
A. The Copyright Bargain: Lessons from History and Some Eco-
nomic Theory
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution27 embodies a hypo-
thetical bargain struck between the polity and its artists: citizens
give artists the right to exclude others from copying their cre-
ations, in return for free use of those creations after the expiration
of a set time.' England's experience under the Stationer's Com-
pany publishing monopoly,29 which led to copyright reform under
26. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 9, at 251-52.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings").
28. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (Copyright law "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven-
tors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."); see also Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (explaining that the granting of a copyright is intended
to encourage individual effort by personal gain in an attempt to advance public welfare);
KRASiLOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 9, at 261-62 (discussing the justifications for a
temporal limitation). Works currently fall into the public domain 50 years after the death
of the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
29. For an examination of this experience, see L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY V.
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 23-27 (1991) (explaining that the self-interest of
1996] CHOIR DIRECTORS AND COPY MACHINES 247
the Statute of Anne," was not a lesson lost on the Framers of
the Constitution.3 They knew that the grant of exclusive rights
would be a cost borne directly by the public, and they demanded
a direct public benefit in return.32 In theory, the possibility of ob-
taining a valuable monopoly provides economic incentives for the
creation of new works which would eventually be dedicated to the
public domain.33 For this reason, the first Congress promptly used
its constitutional authorization and provided protection for maps,
charts, and books in 1790.1
4
Works in the public domain at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution (all of the works of J.S. Bach, for example), re-
mained (and remain) free for all to use. Granting someone an
copyright owners combined well with governmental interests to make copyright an ideal
"instrument of censorship" in seventeenth century England).
30. 8 Anne, ch. 21 (1719) (Eng.). See generally Lyman Ray Patterson, The Statute of
Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223, 225 (1966) (explaining that the
Statute of Anne modified prior British copyright law by extending copyright protection to
anyone complying with the statute (not just members of the book trade), and by limiting
copyright protection to a term of years). In opposing legislation offered in the nineteenth
century to extend the duration of copyright protection, English historian Thomas
Macaulay argued that "[flor the sake of the good we must submit to the evil [of copy-
right protection]; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the
purpose of securing the good." Thomas Macaulay, Speech Before the House of Commons
(Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 THE WoRKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Hannah More
(Macaulay) Trevelyan ed., 1866), cited in Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright" The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1989).
31. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copy-
right Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719,
785-86 (1989) (explaining that the significance of copyright in this period of English his-
tory "was not unknown in eighteenth century America because of the importance at-
tached to the freedom of the press, speech and religion, as demonstrated by the adoption
of the First Amendment"); see also Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SuP.
Cr. REv. 143, 173-74 ("[The Framers] wanted the Intellectual Property Clause to prevent
abuses like those perpetrated when the Stationer's Company exercised complete control
over publishing in England.").
32. See Heald, supra note 31, at 174.
33. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1687 (1988); see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (discussing how to
strike an appropriate balance between access and incentives in copyright law based on
the principles of efficient resource allocation). Cogent arguments can be made that the
economic rationale for copyright is incomplete. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1435-58
(noting that economists "have as yet offered no full-scale philosophic defense for their
position that individual desert should be irrelevant to the allocation of intellectual proper-
ty rights").
34. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124-26.
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exclusive right to a Bach Cantata would impose a cost on the
public without any countervailing benefit. Since the ratification of
the Constitution, Congress has with increasing aggressiveness estab-
lished a system of rewards and incentives for artists." Nobody
can prove that artists are more productive because of copyright
law, but if they have been, the payoff has been spectacular. 6
Consider the vast wealth of musical, literary, and other artistic
works that now belong to the public-everything published before
1921,17 and even some created thereafter3
Congress has always recognized the public's proprietary inter-
est in the public domain. For example, nothing in an arrangement
of a public domain music composition is protected unless it quali-
fies as a "derivative work" which consists of "editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship."39 Even if a composer
creates an original arrangement of a public domain work, the new
copyright "extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material."'
For example, only an original bass line added to a public domain
composition would be protected by copyright. In L. Batlin & Son,
Inc. v. Snyder,4 the Second Circuit provided a clear explanation
why:
Absent a genuine difference between the underlying work of art
and the copy of it for which protection is sought, the public
interest in promoting progress in the arts-indeed, the constitu-
tional demand... could hardly be served. To extend copyright-
35. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) with 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1977) (mentioning no
explicit copyright protection for "architectural works").
36. But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 351 (1970)
("[C]opyright is very much of a mixed blessing. It can lead to prices higher than neces-
sary to secure production ... [and] can impose large transactions costs . . .
37. See supra note 9.
38. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), the failure to
renew a copyright after 28 years of registration put many works published after 1920 and
before 1964 into the public domain. See La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d 813,
814-15 (9th Cir. 1995).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
40. Id. § 103(b). See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCU-
LAR No. 14 (1995) ("Making minor changes or additions of little substance to a preexist-
ing work will not qualify the work as a new version for copyright purposes.").
41. 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (holding copyright of plaintiff's ver-
sion of "Uncle Sam" bank invalid because bank was not substantially original).
248 [Vol. 46: 241
1996] CHOIR DIRECTORS AND COPY MACHINES
ability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for
harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appro-
priating and monopolizing public domain work.4
In other words, the public should not have to pay a monopoly
price for a work that is essentially the same as its public domain
progenitor.
In addition, keeping the public domain free for exploitation
makes economic sense. A musical work, like a lighthouse or a new
word is a "public good." That is to say, each successive use of it
does not diminish its intrinsic value.43 Unlike a piece of land that
is farmed or a car that is driven, no matter how many times a
piece of music is performed, it does not wear out. No matter how
many copies of a musical composition are made, still more can be
made equally cheaply. In theory, once a public good is created,
charging consumers to use it entails a deadweight loss." Limiting
its use serves no purpose, since each successive use does not harm
it. A composition is not like a lake full of fish whose exploitation
must be limited to maintain its stock.
Nonetheless, under some circumstances it may be appropriate
to charge consumers of public goods. It may be rational to grant
their creators exclusive rights for fear that, absent a monetary
incentive allowing for the recovery of sunk costs, some public
goods will not be created in the first place.' In theory, for exam-
ple, some music may not be written in the absence of the mone-
tary incentives provided by copyright law.46 This rationale, of
course, has no application to works that have already been creat-
ed, such as our vast supply of public domain compositions. We
may need incentives for music to be written tomorrow, but not for
music written seventy-five years ago.
42. Id.
43. See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION
THEORY IN USE 251-53 (1969), reprinted in EDMUND W. KrrcH & HARVEY S.
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 47-49 (4th rev. ed.
1991).
44. See id. at 48 (noting that "once the lighthouse is built, exclusion of anyone could
be wasteful").
45. See id. But see Gordon, supra note 30, at 1439 ("Sole reliance on the wealth-
maximizing criterion to grant or deny copyright is highly questionable."). Gordon suggests
"individual desert" is relevant as a non-encouragement-based theory to explain copyright.
Id. at 1447.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
249
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The copyright bargain, whether one views it in economic
terms or as the binding intent of the Framers of the Constitution,
should and does extend to original derivative works. No one be-
lieves, for example, that Aaron Copland's "Appalachian Spring"
should be uncopyrightable because it borrows one of its themes
from the old Shaker hymn "Simple Gifts," a piece long in the
public domain.47 Similarly, the Electric Light Orchestra's "Roll
Over Beethoven" is properly copyrighted in spite of the incorpora-
tion of bits of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony.4" Congress has pro-
vided incentives for composers to mine the public domain and
create original new works. In theory, we would have fewer such
works in the absence of protection. Given the importance of the
public domain as an inspiration for new creations,49 Congress has
rationally included original derivative works as a category of copy-
rightable expression."
Congress has also just as rationally excluded "unoriginal"
variations of public domain works from protection,5 thereby dis-
arming those who may attempt to obtain a "weapon for harass-
ment" by copyrighting works with only minor changes." In this
regard, the Court has defined "original" in such a way as to pre-
clude protection based merely on a work's intrinsic value or the
amount of labor necessary to create it. In Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.,3 the Court denied copyright protec-
tion to the telephone white pages, emphasizing that the Constitu-
tional requirement of authorship54 precluded protection of unorig-
inal works.55 The compilers of the white pages expended substan-
tial effort in creating a very valuable new work, but that was not
enough. Under the rationale of Feist, a court would be forced to
conclude that the cost to the public of granting an arranger or an
editor of public domain music a monopoly is not offset by any
countervailing public benefit when the new work is essentially the
47. See Smith, supra note 17, at 125 n.146.
48. Hear also Paul Simon's "American Tune," which borrows directly from the main
chorale of Bach's "St. Matthew's Passion."
49. Some have even argued that virtually all new works are inescapably based on
public domain materials. See Litman, supra note 5, at 966-67, 1007-11.
50. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a) (1994).
51. See id. § 103(b) (1994).
52. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Synder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
53. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
54. See id. at 344-61; see also supra note 27.
55. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
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same as the original. While new editions of old music are often
useful and valuable, as a matter of constitutional law, Congress
cannot grant copyright protection to unoriginal works no matter
how much sweat has been expended in their creation 6 A new
but unoriginal typesetting and printing of a Billings anthem may
be useful and valuable, but it is not protected by copyright law. 7
I have elsewhere argued that Feist's disavowal of copyright
protection for "sweat of the brow" works may be inconsistent with
the copyright bargain described above, noting that some valuable,
but unoriginal, works may not be created in the absence of copy-
right incentives 8 If, as the economists suggest, copyright is about
establishing wealth-maximizing incentives to bring about new cre-
ations, then Feist's affirmation of a Romantic notion of authorship
may be misplaced. For example, Handel's "Messiah" is a public
domain work, but Congress might rationally conclude that limited
copyright protection for new editions of the "Messiah" are needed
to ensure that the public's demand is satisfied. The Court in Feist
prevents Congress from acting on such a conclusion. To this ex-
tent, the case strays from a purely economic justification for copy-
right, while expressly endorsing it. 9 Although I seriously doubt
that legislation is necessary to stimulate new editions of public
domain music,6° Feist's rationale probably precludes it.
56. See Heald, supra note 31, at 168-75 (arguing that Congress could not use its
power to regulate interstate commerce to grant copyright-like protection to unoriginal
expression).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
58. See Heald, supra note 31, at 158-59 (stating that Feist frustrates Congress from
"conducting a direct inquiry into whether protecting a particular type of work from a
particular type of borrowing is necessary to promote the public welfare").
59. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 ("[W]e conclude that [the Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1976)] envisions that there will be some fact-based works in which the
selection, coordination, and arrangement are not sufficiently original to trigger copyright
protection.").
60. New music software should revolutionize the way in which the music publishing
industry delivers music to consumers. Publishers will no longer be forced to estimate
market demand before they decide to print a fixed number of copies of public domain
sheet music they plan on selling. Technology exists that will allow the publishers to "call
up" a piece of music on a database and then print only the number of copies that are
actually ordered. The lowered cost of producing printed sheet music should facilitate
competition with the photocopy machine; technology will no doubt make public domain
sheet music easier to acquire in the long run.
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B. The Inadequate Caselaw
Only one federal appellate decision in the last forty years
discusses the standard of originality necessary for a new musical
composition to constitute a copyrightable derivative work. In
Woods v. Bourne Co.,61 the Second Circuit held that several ver-
sions of "When the Red, Red, Robin Comes Bob, Bob, Bobbin'
Along" were insufficiently original to constitute copyrightable
derivative works.62 Although the opinion does not reprint the
original song or subsequent versions of it, the court's discussion is
helpful. In 1926, Harry Woods brought a "lead sheet," consisting
of the melody and lyrics of the song, to Irving Berlin, Inc., whose
in-house "technicians" then added harmony and made other
changes.6' Finding the differences between Woods' lead sheet and
the subsequent "piano-vocal" version that was eventually published
to be insubstantial, the district court held the piano-vocal version
to be unoriginal.64 It also found unoriginal a 1981 version of the
song that substituted a moving bass line for the piano-vocal har-
mony, which had primarily consisted of quarter notes on the first
and third beats of every measure.6
The Second Circuit affirmed both these holdings, approving
the legal standard required by the district court:
[S]omething of substance [must be] added making the piece to
some extent a new work with the old song embedded in it but
61. 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (Woods II).
62. The issue of whether the versions of the song were derivative works was made
relevant by 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)-(3) (1994), which gives an atthor, or his heirs, the right
to terminate an improvident assignment of copyright at the end of the renewal term.
However, this termination right, along with the right to capture continuing royalties, does
not extend to original derivations of the assigned copyrighted work prepared before the
termination of the assignment. See Woods II, 60 F.3d at 986. For example, Woods' heirs
terminated Woods' assignment of the copyright of the song at issue to the predecessor in
interest of Bourne Music. Bourne argued that the versions of the song that continued to
generate royalties for it were original derivative works and therefore immune from the
heirs' claims. Thus, the right to the royalties turned on whether the income-producing
versions of the song were sufficiently original to constitute derivative works. In their reli-
ance on precedent involving arrangements of public domain musical works, the district
court and the Second Circuit both presumed that the standard of originality for derivative
musical works in the termination context is the same as that applied in the context of
arrangements of public domain music. See id. at 990-91.
63. See id. at 981, 989, 992.
64. Woods I, 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part,
60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
65. Woods II, 60 F.3d at 993.
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from which the new has developed. It is not merely a stylized
version of the original song where a major artist may take liber-
ties with the lyrics or the tempo, the listener hearing basically the
original tune.... [C]ocktail pianist variations of the piece that
are standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician
[do not suffice].6
The Second Circuit emphasized that a "trivial variation" from the
first work or the mere "demonstration of 'physical skill' or 'special
training"' was not enough.67 Although the circuit court approved
of the district court's factual inquiry into whether the piano-vocal
arrangement was the result of the application of "conventional
rules of harmony,, 61 it did not endorse the district court's dictum
that a derivative work must contain "unusual vocal treatment,
additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered harmonies, [and]
novel sequential uses of themes. 69 Most importantly, the opinion
recognizes the role played by a substantial originality standard in
taking "'a weapon for harassment [from] the hands of mischievous
copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain
work.-2)70
Other decisions which discuss derivative musical arrangements
are also quite sensitive to the danger that trivializing the originali-
ty requirement would present to the public domain. They all de-
mand a palpable contribution by the arranger; whether they apply
precisely the same standard of originality, however, is difficult to
discern. Without the actual pieces of music before us, it is virtually
impossible to conclude whether the reported decisions are really
consistent. For example, Northern Music Corp. v. King Record
Distributing Co.7 holds that "neither rhythm nor harmony can in
itself be the subject of copyright,"'72 overtly conflicting with an-
66. Id. at 991 (quoting Woods , 841 F. Supp. at 121).
67. Id. at 990 (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.
1976) (en banc)).
68. Id. at 992.
69. Id. at 990 (quoting Woods 1, 841 F. Supp. at 121).
70. Id. (quoting Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492). The court also endorsed the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (mimetic
painting of Dorothy taken from a scene of the motion picture The Wizard of Oz not an
original derivative work), that "advised special caution in analyzing originality in deriva-
tive works, since too low a threshold will 'giv[e] the first [derivative work] creator a
considerable power to interfere with the creation of subsequent derivative works from the
same underlying work." Id. (quoting Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305).
71. 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
72. Id. at 400. The court also held that a composer's song was not rendered
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other decision from the same jurisdiction, Tempo Music, Inc. v.
Famous Music Corp.,73 which finds a Duke Ellington harmony
protectable.74 While these two opinions are hard to reconcile,
even the Tempo court demonstrates an awareness of the danger of
adopting a standard of originality that would demand only a trivial
variation from the pre-existing work.' Unfortunately, neither of
these opinions are discussed by the Second Circuit in Woods I, a
frustrating state of affairs given that both cases arise in the South-
ern District of New York.
A relatively small number of other cases are relevant. The
court in McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp.76 refused to find orig-
inality in an arrangement that added an introduction, some repeti-
tion, and "inconsequential melodic and harmonic embellish-
ments."77 In Wihtol v. Wells,7 s the Seventh Circuit protected a
hymn with new lyrics that borrowed from an old Latvian folk
melody remembered from the composer's childhood. A very sim-
ple new bass line was found insufficiently original to be protected
in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co.7 9
With the exception of Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v.
Ashley Publications, Inc.,80 which seems to hold several insignifi-
cant editorial changes copyrightable,8' the language and intent of
the decisions are consistent with the copyright bargain discussed
above. But while the cases do not conflict with the constitutional
and statutory requirements of originality, they provide inadequate
guidance to a consumer concerned with whether a particular ar-
rangement is protected or not. The courts have not consciously
protected insignificant arrangements or approved the "weapon for
harassment" decried by the Second Circuit. However, the pub-
uncopyrightable simply by reason of his use of musical "sequences" employed by others.
Id.
73. 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
74. See id. at 170-71 (finding jazz harmonies added by Duke Ellington to "Satin
Doll" protected by copyright).
75. See id. at 169-70.
76. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
77. Id at 683.
78. 231 F.2d 550, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1956).
79. 91 F. Supp. 473, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
80. 197 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
81. Without the music, it is not possible to determine the extent of the editing that
the court describes. Perhaps it was so extensive that an original work was created. The
court found that there was "at least a modicum of creative work" present and that this
modicum was more than a "mere trivial variation." Id.
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lished decisions have also not thwarted attempts by music publish-
ers to capture the public domain. These publishers, by affixing
copyright symbols to public domain music and thereby intimidating
music buyers, have managed to subvert copyright policy nonethe-
less.
II. SPURIOUS CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT IN MUSICAL
ARRANGEMENTS: THE THREAT TO PUBLIC DOMAIN MUSIC
I have elsewhere explored the causes of action which might be
brought against a publisher who profits by improperly affixing a
copyright symbol to a public domain work.' I have not, however,
previously detailed practices in the music publishing industry or
provided guidance to those seeking to distinguish works in the
public domain, which can be copied, from those that are protected,
which can not. Appendices Al to C2 to this Article provide exam-
ples of public domain works side-by-side with recently "copyright-
ed" versions, illustrating Krasilovsky and Shemel's warning that
"[m]uch of the music material in the public domain is tainted by
vague and indefinite claims of copyright in minimal or obscure
'new versions."'"
A well-known, one-page Brahms chorale for women's voices,
"0 bone Jesu," recently ordered from a national sheet music dis-
tributor for $1.60 plus $2.80 shipping and handling, appears as
Appendix A2.4 At the bottom of the page, one finds a copyright
symbol and the statement "Copyright 1979 by Carus-Verlag
Stuttgart." Undoubtedly, many choir directors and music educators
would think twice about deliberately ignoring the registration sym-
bol and would decide to purchase more copies of the one-page
sheet music at $1.60, rather than make their own copies for three
cents apiece. Inducing reliance on the part of music buyers and in-
timidating them into purchasing, rather than photocopying, music
is a very profitable venture. In the case of "0 bone Jesu," reliance
82. See generally Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four
Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994) (arguing that purchasers who mis-
takenly rely on a seller's false claim of copyright can recover under theories of common
law fraud, unjust enrichment, consumer fraud, and breach of warranty).
83. KRASlLOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 9, at 262.
84. The distributor included two other short works by Bralus for the $1.60. I will
continue to use the $1.60 figure because it was impossible to purchase "0 bone Jesu" by
itself.
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on the copyright claim by the music purchaser increases the
buyer's cost more than fifty-fold.
A comparison of the original 1865 publication 5 with the re-
cently ordered version86 reveals the entirely spurious nature of
the latter's copyright claim. The 1979 publication of "0 bone
Jesu" is exactly the same as the public domain version. All notes
and dynamic markings are identical. A more blatant abuse of the
registration symbol, a symbol which carries with it the threat of
significant civil and criminal penalties for copyright infringe-
ment,' could scarcely be imagined. Music published abroad often
presents this problem, given that copyright protection for new
editions of music is more easily available there.8
Not all spurious claims are so blatant. Appendices B1 and B2
contain the original public domain version and a "copyrighted"
1954 version of William Billings' anthem "Jordan." 9 They are not
quite identical. Although the notes are precisely the same in the
two pieces, the 1954 version (Appendix B2) adds slurs" whenever
two notes are sung on the same syllable, and writes out the repeat
of the refrain that Billings had economically marked instead with a
repeat sign. The 1954 publication also includes a piano reduction
for rehearsal only (the piece is meant to be performed a capella)
which is no more than the notes the choir sings conveniently
marked in one system.9' The reduction is not a new harmoniza-
85. See Appendix Al. This reproduction come from an undated Carus-Verlag
Stuttgart publication of Johannes Brahms, Geistliche Chormusik 128. The editorial notes
in the introduction do not suggest that changes have been made from the original. See
id. at 15-17. The sheet music itself is preceded by a facsimile of its original 1865 cover.
Id. at 127. Note that the publisher of this public domain version is also the publisher of
the "copyrighted" version in Appendix A2.
86. Reproduced as Appendix A2.
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994) (providing civil damages of up to $20,000 per in-
fringement); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1994) (allowing criminal penalties of up to ten years in
prison).
88. For example, in some European countries, sheet music featuring a new typeface
is protectable. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
89. See 3 THE COMILETE WORKS OF WILLIAM BILLINGS, supra note 8, at 180-81.
90. A slur is "a curved line extended over a smaller or larger succession of notes to
indicate the grouping of them with a certain continuity." See 17 THE NEW GROVE DIC-
TIONARY OF MusIc AND MusIcrANs 385 (Stanley Sadie ed., 6th ed. 1980) [hereinafter
NEw GROVE DiCrIONARY]. Importantly, in choral music, "slurs are conventionally (and
unnecessarily) notated only over notes all of which are to be sung on a single syllable."
Id.
91. The reduction does move the tenor line up an octave, which is what most pia-
nists playing without the reduction would do. Although a competent pianist could certain-
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tion or a different tune to be played contrapuntally against the
choir, but merely the same notes that the choir sings, written to
make playing them on the piano easier while the choir sings those
notes in rehearsal.
The copyright claim placed on the 1954 publication is almost
certainly spurious. It flunks even the laxest originality standard
proposed in the cases discussed above. 2 Slurs are a convenience
that add nothing original to the piece-it would sound the same
without them. In the words of one authority, they are "unneces-
sary" in this sort of choral music.93 Writing out the repeat is
merely realizing Billings' own scoring. And, as mentioned above,
the piano reduction is just that-a mechanical condensation of
Billings' own work with nothing new added. We have no new
words or harmonies or other new material of any kind. The 1954
publication, although not identical to the public domain work, is
not "an original work of authorship" as required by the Constitu-
tion and the Copyright Act.94
A good illustration of a valuable, but probably unoriginal,
publication-the final chorus of Act HI ("Hallelujah, Amen") of
Handel's oratorio "Judas Maccabdus" 95 -appears as Appendix C2.
The 1933 publication allows a choir to perform the final chorus
without having to buy the entire 200 page oratorio.96 The orches-
tral accompaniment, which a church choir director may not want,
is also economically deleted. However, as noted in Part I above,97
the constitutionally and congressionally mandated test for
copyrightability is not usefulness or value, but rather originality.
What is original about the 1933 publication? The credited
editor, Norwood Hinkle, marks a repeat of the first twenty-two
measures that is not indicated in the original.98 In a couple of
places where Handel ties two quarter notes, Hinkle writes them
out as a half note, while maintaining the original ties. Handel's
ly play the piece on the piano without the reduction, writing it out makes playing easier.
92. See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
93. 17 NENv GROVE DICTIONARY, supra note 90, at 385.
94. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
95. G.F. Handel, "Hallelujah, Amen" from Judas Maccabiius (1933 version)
(Norwood Hinkle, ed.).
96. See, eg., G.F. Handel, Judas Maccabdus (Arthur D. Walker ed.) (an undated,
uncopyrighted publication containing a score of the entire oratio). Appendix C1 has
been taken from this publication.
97. See supra notes 27-81 and accompanying text.
98. Handel, supra note 95. Appendix C2 does not contain measures 21-38.
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work largely lacks dynamic markings. Hinkle marks "mf' on mea-
sure 5, "f' on measure 12, and "if' on measure 14." He indicates
the tempo at "Allegro, a tempo giusto"'° whereas Handel had
indicated several pages earlier in the original score "andante alle-
gro. '"101Most important, however, the melody, the harmony, and
the rhythm printed in the two pieces are identical. The Hinkle
edition is essentially the same as the original piece that Handel
first directed in 1747.
These three comparisons reflect industry practice as gleaned
from forays through my church's music collection and the Univer-
sity of Georgia's Music Library. Some spuriously copyrighted
publications appear to be no different from the original ("0 bone
Jesu"); some show a few trivial differences ("Jordan"); and some
reveal numerous trivial differences ("Hallelujah, Amen"). The
effects of their copyright claims are identical, however-a great
number of music purchasers choose to buy additional copies of
sheet music instead of photocopying at less expense in deference
to these works' spurious copyright symbols.
III. WHEN IS AN ARRANGEMENT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
MusIc PROTECTED?
The problem created by spurious copyright claims is not insol-
uble. If the consciousness of music purchasers, and of the attor-
neys and professors who may advise them, is sufficiently raised
(the objective of Parts I and II), and they are provided with a
workable standard to judge the originality of the typical features
of an arrangement of a public domain composition (the immediate
objective), the costs of the current predicament can be significantly
reduced.
A relatively limited number of musical techniques are used to
add to, or delete from, a public domain work. The most common
sorts of tinkering can be judged in light of copyright policy and
the extant caselaw to define a fairly clear standard to govern
whether an arrangement is original enough to be copyrighted.
99. Id. Hinkle also marks "poco dim." on measure 23, "cresc." on measure 25, "f'
on measure 29, and "iff adagio" on measure 35. Id.
100. "Lively, at an exact tempo." 1 NEw GRoVE DICrIONARY, supra note 90, at 268;
see also 7 NEW GROVE DICrIONARY, supra note 90, at 419.
101. See Handel, supra note 96, at 211. Andante allegro is defined "[a]t a lively walk-
ing pace." 1 NEw GROVE DICrIONARY, supra note 90, at 268, 397.
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1996] CHOIR DIRECTORS AND COPY MACHINES 259
Surprisingly, the Court's decision in a case not involving music,
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,"° is per-
haps most helpful. In finding the telephone white pages to be
unoriginal, the Court found their arrangement to be "mechanical,"
"routine," "practically inevitable," and an "age-old practice, firmly
rooted in tradition."'1"a The white pages were "entirely typical,"
"garden variety," and "obvious."" The Court indicated that con-
ventionality and lack of significant choice are the keys to judging
the originality of derivative works; °" this notion is very helpful
in judging the originality of arrangements of public domain music.
The only appellate case decided after Feist that discusses origi-
nality in the context of musical arrangements echoes this senti-
ment. In Woods v. Bourne Co., the Second Circuit approved an
inquiry that focused on whether the arranger exercised "deliberate
aesthetic choices" or whether he was merely "applying convention-
al rules of harmony.'0 6 Conventional "cocktail pianist variations"
are not sufficient. In fact, the ease with which inconsequential or
conventional additions to music may be made may have resulted
in a stricter standard than absolutely required by Feist itself.'
°7
One finds a similar focus on convention in non-music deci-
sions after Feist. For example, in finding a title insurance commit-
ment unoriginal and unprotected by copyright law, the Seventh
Circuit found that the selection of data to be included in the form
"was not a matter of discretion based on Mid America's personal
judgment or taste, but instead it was a matter of convention."'0"
102. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
103. Id. at 362-363.
104. Id. at 362.
105. By definition, a phone book is a compilation, and not technically a derivative
work, although the definitions plainly overlap. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Both are treat-
ed together, however, for the purposes of scope of protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)
("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contrib-
uted by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material."). Recent
opinions do not indicate that a different standard of originality should be applied to the
author's contribution in the two cases. See, eg., Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music
Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (employing Feist to judge the originality of
Duke Ellington harmonies to "Satin Doll").
106. Woods II, 60 F.3d 978, 992 (2d Cir. 1995). See supra notes 61-70 and accompany-
ing text.
107. See 1 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMR ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05[C], 2-57 (2d ed. 1978)
(noting a "tendency to require a somewhat greater degree of originality in order to ac-
cord copyright in a musical arrangement").
108. Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir.), cert denied 116 S.
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The contribution of the putative copyright holder was "too rote
and mechanical."'"
The Mid America opinion denies copyright protection for
much the same reasons that a patent is invalid if it represents only
an insignificant improvement over a patent already issued-the im-
provement being "obvious" to someone experienced in the rele-
vant art." Both the copyright law originality requirement and
the patent law non-obviousness requirement focus on whether the
derivative work is the result of conventions familiar to creators
working in the relevant culture. In noting this similarity, a lawyer
friend with a D.M.A. in piano performance suggested to me that
an accurate articulation of the originality test might be whether a
derivation is "within the range of the musical culture." ' This
formulation resonates with the patent law obviousness standard.
Regardless of the precise articulation of the test, the focus on
conventionality is very helpful in evaluating the originality of the
sort of activities that arrangers engage in.
A. Orchestral and Choral Reductions
A sufficiently original reduction of an orchestral work' into
a form playable on a keyboard is copyrightable. Although some
decisions" suggest a very stringent standard for musical reduc-
tions, in Wood v. Boosey,"4 an English court found that a piano
arrangement of an opera was original. The multiple lines of music
played by various orchestral instruments in a complex operatic or
symphonic work can be realized for piano in many different ways.
In the absence of accepted musical conventions which would ren-
Ct. 520 (1995).
109. Id. See also Victor Lalli Enter., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that a document must "demonstrate the requisite minimal origi-
nality" in order to receive copyright protection).
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
111. Interview with David Wolfsohn, J.D., University of Chicago; D.M.A., Manhattan
School of Music (Aug. 4, 1995).
112. See John Philip Sousa, The Stars & Stripes Forever: For Two Pianos, Eight
Hands (1988) (arranged by Mack Wilberg).
113. See Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (finding arrangement of Gilbert and
Sullivan's "Mikado" unoriginal).
114. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 223 (1868).
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der reductions of an opera substantially the same,"' Wood v.
Boosey would seem to be correctly decided.
Of course, a derivative reduction composed "in the spirit of"
the original work which diverged significantly from the original in
melody and harmony would also be copyrightable. Under Feist, the
key to judging the originality of a reduction would seem to be the
number of significantly different options that could be exercised by
the arranger. One of the reasons why the telephone book in Feist
was uncopyrightable was the lack of choices available to someone
arranging phone numbers in a book-alphabetical order is the
choice dictated by convention."6 A similar lack of choice in
choosing and arranging the yellow pages subject headings drives
the holding of unoriginality in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc."7 Under Feist, a
mechanical reduction of an orchestral score that is dictated by
musical convention, where the arranger exercises no significant
choices, would not be original. Choices made outside the dictates
of convention would be protected.
Most piano reductions of non-orchestral works, such as choral
arrangements, are entirely dictated by the choral parts. Billings'
"Jordan" in Appendix B2 provides a good example of this."'
Since the reduction is dictated by the vocal parts, it is unprotected.
As already noted, most piano reductions of choral works are
merely the sung notes reproduced for the pianist's convenience
onto a system below the choral lines."9 No new musical material
is added. On the other hand, an accompaniment that added origi-
nal harmonizations or a new contrapuntal melody would be pro-
tected. The presence of a sufficiently original piano or organ part
does not, however, absolutely prevent the use of the arrangement.
Blocking out the protected material before photocopying is permis-
sible.Y In addition, new music software makes it quite easy to
115. See discussion of the realization of figured basses infra notes 132-34 and accom-
panying text.
116. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) ("It
is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to
be expected as a matter of course.") (citing Brief for Information Industry Assoc. at 10
(no. 89-1909)).
117. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the selection and arrangement of the
Miami Yellow Pages is not original).
118. See supra text accompanying note 91.
119. See id.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994) (copyright to derivative works does not extend to
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Although some older caselaw suggests that harmonic additions
to public domain music are unprotectable as a matter of law,'2
the opinions are ultimately unconvincing. The facts of Cooper v.
James" illustrate the problem. Many songs in the first published
versions of the famous "Sacred Harp" hymnal were written in
three-part harmony; they lacked an alto line. In other words, all
women would sing the soprano line or the tenor line pitched up
an octave. The copyright claimant in Cooper wrote alto lines for
compositions in the hymnal and sued when they were copied by a
competitor. The court held that the addition of an alto harmony
could never be sufficiently original.124 When viewed from a late-
twentieth-century perspective, this holding seems hopelessly out-
dated both jurisprudentially and musically.
The court in Cooper applies the "mere mechanic" test of
Jollie v. Jaques" and reasons that originality is lacking because
any musician of reasonable talent could compose an alto part. This
may be true, but after Feist the question is not the talent level of
the composer, but whether significant choices were exercised in the
course of the harmonization. In other words, were these musicians
pre-existing materials).
121. Intermediate copying of protected musical material in order to access and repro-
duce only the public domain elements should constitute a fair use of the protected mate-
rial. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (defining "fair use" of copyright). For example, a new
English translation of the words of a public domain Latin hymn is probably protected by
copyright. A choir director may wish to perform the unprotected ancient Latin version.
Copying the entire composition, including the new translation, in order to block out the
new English words, leaving only the public domain music and Latin lyrics for distribution
to the choir is almost certainly a fair use. See Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that copying protected elements of computer
program in order to gain an understanding of unprotected functional elements is fair
use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (holding that downloading copyrighted material to access its public domain compo-
nents can be permissible fair use).
122. See Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
123. 213 F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
124. See id. at 872-73.
125. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437) (holding arrangement of "The Serious
Family Polka" uncopyrightable).
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of "reasonable talent" guided in writing similar alto lines by exist-
ing musical conventions? A line dictated by accepted rules of
composition would not be original, but if the rules permitted nu-
merous harmonic possibilities or if the new alto part broke signifi-
cantly from convention, then it would be original. A musicologist
familiar with the harmonic conventions of the era and a sense of
the options available to a composer of an alto line written in the
style of Southern Harmony could tell us whether the alto parts at
issue in Cooper were original or not.'26
The more recent decision in Tempo Music Inc. v. Famous
Music Corp.27 would seem more in tune with both the principles
of Feist and modem music theory. At issue were harmonies com-
posed by jazz great Duke Ellington. The court rejected the
defendant's claim that harmony "results only from the formulaic
application of centuries-old compositional rules."' Recognizing
the breakdown of conventions in modern Western music, the court
noted that "in the jazz music genre, musicians frequently move
beyond traditional rules to create a range of dissonant and innova-
tive sounds.' 29 Emphasizing the choices available to (and made
by) Ellington in his harmonization of "Satin Doll," the court found
the harmonies to be sufficiently original. While recognizing that
"in most instances, harmony is driven by melody,"'"3 and may in
those cases be unprotected, the court refused to "deprive appropri-
ate protection to composition which contains sufficient originality
and creativity to warrant such protection.' 3'
The inquiry into the originality of a harmony is similar to the
inquiry into the originality of a reduction. What choices were
available to the composer? Has the harmony been dictated by pre-
existing elements in the public domain work or is it a break from
126. "Southern Harmony" is a style best characterized by the music contained in
William Walker's Southern Harmony and Musical Companion. See WILLIAM WALKER,
SOUTHERN HARMONY AND MUSICAL COMPANION (Glenn C. Wilcox ed., 1987) (contain-
ing a collection of hymns, tunes, odes, psalms, and anthems first printed in 1854). The
melody in Southern Harmony is generally found in the tenor line and, in order to facili-
tate singing by untrained voices, the music is often written in "shape notes" rather than
traditional notation. See id. at v-viii. Most songs in Southern Harmony lack an alto line
entirely. See id. at x.
127. 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
128. Id. at 168.
129. Id.




musical convention? Obviously, the originality of a harmony must
be judged on an ad hoc basis and with the help of a musicologist
who understands the nature of the real choices, if any, exercised
by its composer.
C. Realizing Figured Basses, Rekeying, and Recleffing
Johann Sebastian Bach, like many of his contemporaries, did
not write out in modem musical notation the harmony to his com-
positions, but instead indicated those lines numerically.'32 This
convenient device enabled a Baroque composer to save the time
and space it would have taken to write out the composition com-
pletely. Although a talented keyboard player can play directly
from the figuring,' most modem arrangers of works containing
figured basses write them out in standard notation. A realization
of a figured bass line is almost certainly not protected because the
realization evinces very little, if any, choice on the part of the
arranger. Competent arrangers realizing a figured bass will inevi-
tably write it out in much the same way, thereby failing to meet
Feist's originality requirement.
Similarly, an arrangement is unprotected if it merely trans-
poses the entirety of a public domain work into a new key to
make it easier (or in the case of a bad or weird arrangement,
harder) to sing or play. Transposition from key to key is entirely
mechanical and free of choice. Any competent musician (or a
computer program) will produce the same piece when asked to
transpose "Jordan" from A major to C major. The same rationale
that results in the protectability of the realization of a figured bass
and many piano reductions dictates that the mere rekeying of a
piece is unprotected.
The conversion of an older piece of music notated in an obso-
lete clef" into modem bass or treble clef is also an unpro-
tectable contribution. The recleffed work will sound exactly the
same and the process of recleffing is entirely mechanical. No
choice is exercised by the person (or computer) doing the work.
132. See 6 NEw GROVE DICIONARY, supra note 90, at 544-45.
133. See Smith, supra note 17, at 112 n.45.
134. A clef is "[t]he sign placed at the beginning of a staff to denote the pitch of
one of its lines." See 4 NEW GROVE DICrIONARY, supra note 90, at 473-75 (discussing
the history of the uses of various different clefs). Only bass and treble clef are consid-
ered standard for modem choral compositions.
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The sole motivation of the arranger is the convenience of the
performer who may not feel comfortable with an unfamiliar clef.
D. Typeface and Facsimile Editions
American law, unlike that of some foreign countries,'35 does
not extend copyright protection to typefaces. 6 Therefore, a mu-
sic publisher cannot obtain protection for a new publication of a
public domain work simply by reprinting it in a different type. For
similar reasons, a facsimile edition of a composer's original works
(perhaps even of the initial handwritten drafts37) is unprotect-
able. Although West Publishing has argued that its formatting of
opinions and page placement is protected by copyright law,'38
this assertion probably does not survive Feist.'39
E. Critical Comments and Corrections
Significant editorial comments that accompany a public do-
main composition may be protected. A recent edition of the com-
plete works of William Billings contains significant introductory,
historical, and critical materials that are protected original expres-
sion, even though most of the compositions themselves can be
freely copied.' ° Sometimes such comments appear on the musi-
cal composition itself. As noted above, one can always avoiding in-
fringing such material by blocking it out before photocopying.' 4
Copying the commentary itself may even be a fair use, if it is only
copied to access the public domain material and is not itself ex-
ploited by the copier.'42
135. See, eg., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright
Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J.
1143, 1243 n.525 ("Typeface designs are protectible as ornamental designs under the
Italian Design Law of 1940." (citation omitted)).
136. See Monotype Corp. v. International Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir.
1994).
137. An example of this would be Handel's Messiah, on file in the University of
Georgia music library. See Handel's Conducting Score of Messiah (reproduced in facsimile
from the Manuscript in the Library of St. Michael's College, Tenbury Wells) (1974).
138. See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
139. See Heald, supra note 31, at 160-61 (arguing the likelihood that Feist overrules
West, noting that the Feist opinion cites to a law review critical of West).
140. See THE COMPLEE WoRKs OF WILLIAM BmLINGS, supra note 8, at xiii-lxili.
141. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Many editorial choices, however, may be too trivial to be
protected at all. For example, the original version of "Jordan,""4
taken from a wonderful edition of his complete works edited by
Karl Kroeger,' 4 is not exactly what Billings wrote. The collec-
tion, on occasion, makes corrections when Kroeger thinks that the
initial publication was misprinted in some way. In "Jordan," for
example, he places the notation "Forte" over measure 25, where it
sensibly belongs.' 45 This move puts it over "So" which clearly
starts a new musical thought, rather than over "to," which would
be an awkward and unconventional place to begin an increase in
volume. The notes to the Kroeger edition indicate that the first
publication of "Jordan" placed the "Forte" erroneously over mea-
sure 26.46 We can be grateful to Kroeger, and to subsequent
publishers who have moved Billings' "Forte" to the place where he
probably intended it, but this contribution is unoriginal in the
constitutional and statutory sense.
One commentator who argues for the increased protection of
editorial changes reasons that the law should "reward[] those edi-
tors who, through diligent effort and research, have preserved the
integrity of the original."'47 His rationale for protection reveals
why most editorial changes cannot be constitutionally protected.
First, according to the court in Feist, "copyright rewards originality,
not effort."' 48 The court expressly rejected the "sweat of the
brow" rationale that was once generally accepted. 49 Second, edi-
torial changes that are designed to make a composition truer to
the composer's intent would seem by definition to be unoriginal.
Such efforts are by definition intended not to create a new work,
but to preserve the essence of the old. Although one could imag-
ine that a very speculative edition of an ancient musical fragment
incorporating numerous creative choices might be protectable, the
run-of-the-mill changes made to most commonly performed com-
positions are, for better or worse, usually unoriginal in the legal
sense.
143. See Appendix BI.
144. See 3 THE COMPLETE WoRKs OF WmmmAM BLnGS, supra note 8, at 180-81.
145. This is the only change he makes. See iL
146. See id. at 376.
147. See Smith, supra note 17, at 137.
148. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).
149. Id. at 352.
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F. Fingering
Some publications of public domain compositions include
helpful notations indicating how the piece should be physically
realized on a particular instrument. Compositions for string instru-
ments in particular occasionally include fingering, bowing or articu-
lation notations. These suggestions on how to play a series of
notes are sometimes included for beginners learning how most
easily to play a piece, or they may be suggestions for accomplished
musicians experimenting with various ways of interpreting the
piece. 5' On some instruments, the choice of fingering or bowing
methods can directly affect the sound made by the instrument and
therefore the performer's interpretation of the piece.'
Notation that is designed to make a piece easier for the nov-
ice to play should be unprotected. Accepted methods of fingering
or bowing that are dictated by ease of playing are not original.
Significant interpretative choices made by performers of string
music, however, can depend on various fingering or bowing op-
tions. 2 The mere existence of options, however, is not disposi-
tive. Although a musician may make one interpretive choice
among several, the originality standard may still not be met within
the relevant musical genre or culture.
An example may serve to illustrate the problem. Imagine a
modem arrangement of the Bach Sonata in C Major for two vio-
lins and harpsichord which indicates that the strings should be
fingered by a violinist wearing aluminum thimbles. Such an origi-
nal and unconventional notation would arguably be protected.
Imagine, on the other hand, the three alternative fingerings sug-
gested by Ronald Smith for the first movement, measures 3-4, of
the second violin part of the same Bach sonata."M He explains
150. See Smith, supra note 17, at 136-37 n.203 (discussing four possible fingerings of
Bach's Sonata in C Major for two violins and harpsichord). See generally 6 NEw GROVE
DICrIONARY, supra note 90, at 567 (defining "fingering").
151. See Smith, supra note 17, at 136 ("A difference in fingering . . . is often the
difference between a mediocre performance and one of artistry. This is equally true of
bowing. .... ).
152. See id. at 136 n.203.
153. BWV 1037 (1741). It is interesting to note that authorship of this sonata has, in
fact, been attributed to Johann Gottlieb Goldberg. See THEMATISH-SYSTEMASCHES
VERZEICHNIS DER MUSIKALISCHEN WERKE VON JOHANN SEBASTIAN BAcH 754
(Wolfgang Schmeider ed., 1990).
154. See Smith, supra note 17, at 136-37 n.203.
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with great insight the differences in sound produced by the finger-
ings that he offers, the aesthetic advantages of each, and the skill
required to play each option. His discussion concludes that
"[b]ecause of the originality and intellectual labor required in
designing them, fingerings are worthy of copyright protection. 155
Without the teaching of Feist and Woods v. Bourne Co. at his
disposal, he is not prompted to offer an opinion on how conven-
tional his suggested fingerings are. Are these variations that any
"cocktail violinist"'56 would naturally offer? Are they obvious op-
tions well within the range of the musical culture? If they answer
to these questions is "yes," then it's difficult to see how any of the
fingerings offered by Smith would be protected under current
precedent.
G. Rhythm: Meter, Ties, and Bar Lines
Although an early case suggests that rhythm is not protect-
able,157 one can imagine how extensive rhythmic changes might
make a public domain work virtually unrecognizable. While an
original rhythmic contribution to a public domain work is conceiv-
able (for example, imagine a rap version of the fourth movement
of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), many arrangers tinker with
rhythmic notation merely to make performance of the piece easier.
For instance, although the director of our church choir remetered
several measures of a piece we recently sang, her motivation was
not to create an original work of authorship but to facilitate her
choir's reading of the piece. She felt that the shifting meter of the
original which enabled the maintenance of even note values was
distracting, and rewrote it in a single meter with shifting note
values to make the piece easier to sing.
My director's practice-one that is not uncommon-raises two
issues. First, one must judge the originality of her choice to change
the metering by comparing it to musical conventions governing the
transposition of meter.'58 Second, one must ask the question
whether a change in the written expression of music which does
not change the sound of the piece when performed could ever be
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying note 14.
157. See Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
158. In other words, would another director testify, "That's an obvious thing to do"?
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the subject of copyright. At least some opinions suggest that the
originality of new version of an existing musical work turns on
whether it sounds sufficiently different than the existing one. 59
Under this test, my director's changes are surely unoriginal-they
effect no difference at all. Since the reason for reducing music to
tangible written expression is to stimulate a particular sound when
it is performed, this focus on the lack of aural difference may be
consistent with the rationale of the originality requirement. My
director's changes had the same effect as the work of the skilled
artisan who carefully cleans the mold and grime off of the fresco
of the Last Supper. They both make the underlying work of art
more accessible, but their contribution is not original in the copy-
right sense."6
Raising a similar issue are many works written centuries ago,
such as Gregorian chants, that contain no bar lines or indication of
meter at all. One must remember that just because a piece lacks
rhythmic markings does not mean that an exact rhythm is not gen-
erally understood to be implied. Markings may be lacking, not
because the composer did not care how a piece was sung, but
rather because he knew that given existing conventions, no real
performance options existed. The musical culture's equivalent of
the Uniform Commercial Code notion of "usage in the trade" fills
many "gaps" that we may perceive in an old piece of music. An
arranger who does nothing more than realize in modern notation
what was, and may still be, understood as the conventional way to
perform the piece has not made an original contribution.
An arranger, however, may go further and change the intend-
ed feel of a piece by shifting the overall meter and rebarring it,
for example, taking a waltz and playing it as a two-step in cut
time, without changing melody or harmony. 6' Would such a
rhythmically different arrangement of a public domain work be
protected by copyright law? Protecting a cut time version of a
public domain waltz would serve little or no purpose. It would
reward the labor and industriousness of the arranger for making
159. See Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
160. My director shares this conclusion.
161. See Joe Young, John Siras, & Jack Little, In a Shanty in Old Shanty Town (M.




the mechanical adjustments to the original work, but would not
really reward an original musical contribution. The arranger may
have been the first to conceive of arranging the work in cut time,
but copyright law does not offer protection to ideas. 62 The tan-
gible expression of an idea, which may be protected, is in this case
a mechanical operation that involves no significant choice to be
exercised by the arranger.
Obviously, some rhythmic changes are significant and could be
protected. Walter Murphy published disco versions of several pub-
lic domain works on his 1972 "A Fifth of Beethoven" album. Such
unconventional rhythmic gerrymandering may well be original; the
fact that much tinkering with rhythm is insignificant does not
mean that an arranger cannot, in fact, make an original contribu-
tion by making rhythmic changes.
H. Dynamic Markings and Editing
New arrangements of public domain compositions frequently
alter musical dynamics by adding or deleting slur marks and re-
peats, indications of crescendo and diminuendo, or volume mark-
ings. Such changes effect the mood, flow, or "feel" of the piece.
Many public domain works contain sparse dynamic markings or
lack them altogether." An arranger of such a work may add
dynamics to realize the sound she believes the composer originally
intended for the work. As noted above, many older works lacked
rhythmic or dynamic markings altogether because generally accept-
ed musical conventions dictated how the piece would be per-
formed.' 64 Alternatively, the arranger may be trying to adapt a
public domain work to her own vision. For example, a section to
be sung "marcato"' may be changed to "legato"' or a sec-
tion may be changed to be sung "piano" instead of "forte." In
fact, choir directors spontaneously make these sorts of changes to
a piece during rehearsal in an attempt to produce precisely the de-
sired musical effect.
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
163. See Appendices B1 and C1.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
165. Translated, "accented" or "stressed". 11 NEw GROVE DICTIONARY, supra note
90, at 647.
166. Translated, "connected smoothly." 10 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY, supra note 90,
at 610.
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The originality of changes in dynamic markings turns on the
overall effect they have on the sound of piece. As the Second
Circuit stated in Woods v. Bourne Co., the arrangement must be
"to some extent a new work with the old song embedded in it but
from which the new has developed."'67 Even though they may
not affect the melody, harmony, or rhythm of a musical composi-
tion, a significant audible difference may be perceptible since
markings are directions to performers telling them: "This is how
you should sing this composition." The critical inquiry is whether
the changes in dynamics are obvious-that is, suggested by rele-
vant conventions-or not.
The issue of extensive, but obvious, textual editing arose in
Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publishers, Inc.'" In that case, the
editor of a public domain biography made over 40,000 changes to
grammar, syntax, and word choice. This extensive editing was
found not to be protected by copyright law. The court found that
mere editing of the sort any "high school English student" could
do was not sufficiently original. 69 The new edition undoubtedly
had a different "feel" than the public domain book, but the court
required more of an original contribution to its essence. No one
denied the value of the editorial contributions to the new pub-
lication, but the test under Feist, again, is not value or usefulness
but originality measured as departure from convention.'
Viewed in light of the copyright bargain discussed above,
denying protection to insubstantial changes in dynamics makes
sense. Massaging an existing work is not the same as creating an
original derivative work. If one could obtain copyright protection
merely by adding a "forte" to a measure of a public domain com-
position, a dangerous "weapon for harassment" would be available
for anyone to exploit. The originality standard would be no
standard at all if a trivial variation would suffice for copyright.
Would extensive and radical changes in dynamic markings be
original? Substantial additions that worked a significant change to
the essence of the piece could suffice. Additions that are "typical,"
167. Woods 11, 60 F.3d 978, 991 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
168. 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
169. Id. at 605.
170. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-64 (1991).
171. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en bane).
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"routine," "obvious," or "practically inevitable," to use the Feist
phraseology, should be insufficient.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE OR STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
As the preceding discussion suggests, users of public domain
music trying to determine whether a registered work is in fact
original find little concrete guidance in legislation or in the existing
caselaw. In this respect, future courts will hopefully be able to
provide some assistance with the help of expert witnesses. A court
sensitive to copyright policy should be capable of determining
which sorts of arrangements of public domain music are original.
Furthermore, the decision in Feist should be enough to establish
the importance of the originality requirement. Nevertheless, al-
though the judiciary and secondary sources can help by clarifying
the legal parameters of the originality requirement, only Congress
or the Copyright Office can help provide the relevant facts needed
by those making decisions about whether to photocopy or to buy
arrangements of public domain music: what changes did the ar-
ranger actually make to the public domain piece? No informed
decision as to the originality of the arrangement can be made
unless the additions and deletions made to the public domain work
have been ascertained. In spite of the fact that I live in a city with
a decent music library, I have had trouble collecting the public
domain versions of various well-known works. Imagine the plight
of the choir director or school administrator who has neither a
major university music library in town nor the time to do signifi-
cant sleuthing.
In rare instances, a consumer can obtain the relevant infor-
mation from the Copyright Office. The Copyright Office requires
the applicant for a copyright in a derivative work, like a musical
arrangement, to disclose both the preexisting material on which
the arrangement is based and also to make "a brief, general state-
ment of the additional new material covered by the copyright
claim for which registration is sought."'72 For a moderate fee, the
Copyright Office will conduct a search and supply the application
record.'1 3 The information provided, however, will only be useful
172. See U.S. Copyright Office, Filling Out Application Form PA, at SPACE 6: De-
rivative Work or Compilation.
173. See KRAsiLoVsKY & SHEMEL, supra note 9, at 263-64 (explaining Copyright Of-
fice inquiries).
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if the applicant was both honest and detailed in his or her applica-
tion. Unfortunately, the directions on the application allow the ar-
ranger to respond very generally. 74 More importantly, in many
cases the requested information cannot be obtained in a timely
fashion, or is too costly.
In economic terms, we have a problem with prohibitively high
search costs. A music buyer is unlikely to spend significant time in
the library or contact the Copyright Office in order to ascertain
whether a particular arrangement is original unless a significant
amount of money is at stake. As noted above, 75 although a huge
sum is at stake in the aggregate, each individual purchasing de-
cision does not generally implicate sufficient savings in photocopy-
ing to justify incurring substantial search costs.
Several possible solutions suggest themselves. First, the Copy-
right Office, taking its cue from Patent Office practice, should
require that "prior art" (the pre-existing composition) be submitted
along with the derivative work sought to be registered. This would
greatly facilitate the identification of precisely what an arranger
has added to, or deleted from, an existing work. It would also
clarify the nature of the claims made under the registration, be-
cause as a matter of law, material contained both in the pre-exist-
ing work and in the derivative work would not be protected. In
addition, a composer should have to list all the elements of the
new arrangement that she feels are original. 6 An application for
a derivative musical work would thus be like a patent application,
where the inventor must specify precisely what claims he is mak-
ing.
The Copyright Office or Congress could also employ the
Internet to drastically reduce consumer search costs and improve
the quality of administrative decision making. The Copyright Of-
fice could, for example, establish a web site accessible on the
Internet that would contain the information provided by applicants
for copyrights in derivative musical arrangements. Consumers of
public domain arrangements would then have instant computer
174. For example, "Arrangement for piano and orchestra" will suffice. See Filling Out
Application Form PA, supra note 172, at SPACE 6: Derivative Work or Compilation.
175. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
176. The Copyright Office could, for example, require greater detail in answers given
to Question 6(b) in Form PA. See id. Additional information on the application in-
structions would help arrangers understand what is an original contribution.
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access to the elements claimed as original in the arrangement.
They could then make an informed choice whether to buy or to
photocopy. Such a web site would likely be inexpensive to estab-
lish and maintain given current volume. The Office might even list
information from past applications already on file. These adminis-
trative suggestions could eventually reduce the millions of dollars
needlessly spent by public institutions, churches, and other consum-
ers on unoriginal arrangements of public domain music.
Consumers of sheet music may also be able to force reform
through litigation. I have previously outlined four causes of action
that could successfully be brought against those who make spuri-
ous claims of copyright to public domain music.'" Consumer
class actions based on breach of warranty, unjust enrichment,
fraud, and consumer protection or false advertising statutes offer a
promising means of dissuading those who profit from false claims.
The implication of a private cause of action in the criminal pro-
hibition of falsely affixing a copyright symbol is also a possibili-
ty.78 This statutory provision may provide yet another avenue of
deterrence. Of course, private litigation would be unnecessary if
the Department of Justice played a more active role in policing
violations. A number of visible and substantial fines might provide
the greatest disincentive of all against the plundering of the public
domain. Sheet music without a copyright registration is hard to
find now, but an aggressive litigation strategy may make the ab-
sence of the symbol on public domain works more common.
CONCLUSION
Although the Constitution, the Copyright Act, and judicial
opinion clearly require arrangements of public domain music com-
positions to be "original" to receive protection from copying, mu-
sic publishers' persistent claims to public domain works have creat-
ed a climate where most consumers instinctively pay for new sheet
music rather than copy it. High search costs and a dearth of appel-
late precedent make it difficult even for sophisticated consumers to
investigate and challenge music publishers' spurious and very prof-
itable claims to copyright. This Article has demonstrated, however,
177. See generally Heald, supra note 82.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(c). But see Donald Frederick Evans & Assoc., Inc. v. Conti-
nental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 912 (11th Cir. 1986) (no private right of action under
17 U.S.C. § 506(c)).
[Vol. 46:241
1996] CHOIR DIRECTORS AND COPY MACHINES 275
that caselaw, informed by copyright policy as explicated in Feist,
can provide sufficient guidance-most changes that arrangers make
to public domain compositions can be adequately judged by the
musically-informed layperson to be original or not. The most per-
sistent problem lies in the determination of exactly what changes
have been made. Only the Copyright Office or Congress can pro-
vide sufficiently cheap access to this information.
When publishing companies attempt to extend the protective
reach of copyright laws to their advantage, they rely on the mov-
ing metaphor of the Aspiring Artist. 9 Even though the Supreme
Court explains that copyright law makes "reward to the owner a
secondary consideration,"'" it also recognizes that public welfare
is advanced through the "talents of authors."'' The Court sees
the entire picture: the interests of both the public and the author
are at stake in the debate over the parameters of copyright. The
metaphor of the Aspiring Artist, then, only captures half of the
story.
Other stories need to be told. The public domain will not
continue to be robust if it remains a conceptual abstraction-direct
and indirect consumers of music have little voice when the public
domain is balanced against the more tangible interests of the As-
piring Artist. For this reason, the public domain needs its own
avatar in the public debate. As this Article has demonstrated, the
Choir Director and Musical Arranger are viable candidates. The
Movie Director, borrowing liberally from public domain scenes d
faire, plot twists, and stock characters, may be another. The Digital
Future Coalition, a loose association of computer programmers
and others with information age interests, nominates the Internet
Surfer."
179. See, for example, the World Wide Web edition of Playback, the bimonthly maga-
zine of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). In the
"Legislative Update" section of this year's January-February issue, ASCAP encourages
readers to lobby members of Congress in favor of the proposed "Life Plus 70" copyright
extension: "Those of us who make our living from our music, and those who hope to,
deserve to be compensated when our music is used." PLAYBACK (1996) <http:
I/www.ascap.comlplayback1996lfebruaryllegislative.html#congress> (emphasis added).
180. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
181. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
182. In championing an amendment to proposed legislation affecting copyright on the
Internet, for example, the Digital Future Coalition makes the following argument against
labeling the unlicensed viewing of a web site as a copyright violation: "If such automati-
cally erased images are considered true 'copies' under the Copyright Act, . . . the right
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Convincing economic argument in favor of protecting the
public domain is one tool of persuasion. The music publishing
industry, however, is best confronted by another-specific exam-
ples of the way in which the public domain benefits individuals.
The experience of the Choir Director is a good place to start.
and opportunity to browse information on-line now enjoyed by millions will be seriously
underminded or-at some point soon--completely precluded." Digital Future Coalition,
Digital Future Coalition Amendment to "Nil Copyright Protection Act" Facilitating Brows-
ing and Networking (visited Nov. 11, 1996) <http.//www.ari.netdfcelegislat/pagers.htm#il06>.
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b- mn, da br r-b-mn w..a do te. er-echaf fen hoet, wellt du or Roe •
~~~~~ f - P P
ml-se -e -re no.his, qul-a tu ere- stnos, t to -do-ml - -oi
bar - mndetn Er - bo-e4n, wel d tns r -ho - tun hst, wel.. l o r • tod •
mis-UtU-RUo no-his qUi- a L to o- a - oti nos, to to-do-m - -
bsv- man, dat,, Er -ba-mn, welt due une er-teh! - fan hoot, welt du ver g ot
13 is ,s.s. 15
mv sn - - -gul -ne tu -o prae - U o - &s- • - tMo.
hot. oer - ..s sen hAst dabn Blut, da.. Blbet, do- hltt -- U tho.
Ai P. e-rs- -ec
- R&.nos san -. gul-n . tu-o pram-.U - o - Ela- - t-mo,
- sn..ht, tee -as - osn BtuLdalntot data et. dos- k5lt • U - chf,
host, dee. I r.. ga : - :he...... a." Blt d" . Bl, .. s- : '
nos an- - gul-neo tu-o,. tu . o prm . t - o - sa - - -Mo.hut, du. "I. ao.. -.a-n "ost- d-InBlut, de1n Blur, doss k~t . 1 •cheo
A =- espres. ceic. -t
s- t nos sn - gul - no tu- o, tu -b pra-ti - o - sis-G- o.
msan host. du ver " teasn hos dab. Brut, dab. Blest do- A.... bet-bU - cho,
Dutschor Texts Paul Horn
128 CV 40.179
1996] CHOIR DIRECTORS AND COPY MACHINES 279
APPENDIX A2: "0 BONE JESU" ("COPYRIGHTED" VERSION)
Drei geisfliche Ch5re fr Frauensdimmen, opus 37









A - 3 7: cresw.
O bo-ne Je- - in, o.bo-ne Je - in, ml - re ore - re,.
O..... slit . g, .r o. - g€o oe_ gt . ge, Jo . oa, ohenh oo dot,, B -
o ho-ne Je- - in o ho-e Je-in, ml- re -re -re,
o gut-go, ~.e - - . e o t-go, Jo - go, osehl uno. €do!_.. -
.3 .J - ' " "ii- - '--I- -. - =  -_-0- bo-ne Jo- - 0, obo.ne - su,- ml - - -re,
O . sat - S-, J. - - o. o c st-go, Je - &.. w oehenk oo.- deln ErA PP C.-
0v ., e , .- = su, 0- - n=--e Je ,sa rae ,
0 ga ,,f. _e Su o sa I ge -k m, Ihn ,u .em Er I I I I
0 bo-ne A - - su, o bo-ne Je- s, ,ml - - re -. re,
0 gat - ger . - ga o e t-go, Jo - s0, ehenk€ uns doi.-Er
mi- se- re -re no-bs, qut-a hi cre-a - st! nos.. tu re-de-m - -
b" .4, d Mr - -4 -a d. --.. wf -- du v- - go*
" I 1 
IF
ml-e- se - re no-his, qui-a tu cre-a - no,% -de-m -
b= - un,. den E, - bo-o . t.n" do z ,-o.ha - fd to - go. - - -
A f - P P ~
ml - se-re -re no-bs, qui- Va u cre-a- si nos, tu..re -de- m- - i
ba- - men,,dof, E r - bo,-mec. t du to, or . e.haf - fm, hoot. wea-.. du t . - .-A f - V VP . ..=::==. P
mi-se - re- re no-b qui-a tu cre-a - stinos, tu re-de-ml -
5o - aen. do.n B - bo--, we!? du unt er-.haf - fmn hast. wea do vto - go. - - -
1571I , SPTSSS. 15 17 t'
A - 13 ,c.. es. AE-"4, _ J
san - - -guL-o u -o prae - - o - sis- - - ti-mo.
hoot, eo -g. o h. dot, Slot. deln..Blot. do. t- -~s - u - hrs.
^p pesprssse. . . cresc. , =f
sti-nos san- - -gu-ne tu-o pre - ti -o- ss - - M-mo.
- uhof.. - - , h.t........ t,t dot,, Brot. do. -.... hkt- - U c he
A - .P-I , __ I " 1=-
C IJ * , I ,"t " I .- . ;-" 1-.i I
nos sann - gu l-ne e -o,- tu-o pre - o - sis- - s- mo.
hoot. . . eo- go. - .On hat . dobtBut, di.s Blut, d. - h5ot - U Si - the.
A ==- P pePprePs5 crec. -
V 5 G, 't ,
sti nos sn -gi - ne tu- o, t - o pr- ti - o -sis-si- Mo.
a nt hoot. du t . go. -en hast dd. B1.t delt Blot, dat- kot- U - ch
Q Copyright 1979 by Csooo-Vcr Smtg r - CV 40.701 Hcr4LTthbw. GrCher Gr=rich
Alto R,-hte w.rtbhiven / AU rights r esvd I Tous droits r6sc s D-tsch.Tcc=n=-kgr. Pool Horn
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t - !J J I -ItI-J j J j
There is a Land of- pure De- light, Where-.
I I -
There is a Land of-. pure-. Dc- light, Where
There is a Land of-. pure De- light, Where.
Saints im- mo- tal reign; in. fi- nite Day ex-
Saints ir- Mor- tal reign; In fi- nite Day ex-
Saints ir- mor- tal reign; In- fi- nite Day ex.
Saints- lea- Mor- tal reign; - In- 6i- nite Day ex-
c eludes the Night, And Plea- sures ban- ish Pain.
- ludes the Night, And Plea- sures ban- ish Pain.
- ludes the Night. And- Plea- sures ban- ish Pain.
x8o The Suffolk Harmony
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II ° Sweet Fields be- y~d the. swell- ing. Flood, Stsnd.
- - - - - - - ..
Sweet Fields be- yond the- swell- ing_ Hood, Stand
So to the... be tws old
So to the Jews old
dress'd in liv- log Green: So to the Jews old-
dres'd in- liv- ing Green: So to the Jews old
.3 P o i o
Ca- nsn stood, While Jor- dan. roll'd_ be- tween.
Ca- nan stood, While Jot- dsan roldo be- tween.
Cs- aaan stood, "hie.. Jot- dso.. rol'd.. be- tweeo.
Ca- naam stood, While - Jor- dari_. roll'd.. be- tween.
Jordan 181
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Piano S are arr. by Irving Lowess
ras (1707)
whxere saints isafilr
There is a land oL.. pure, de - iglitWlirec saints isa -
There is a land oL. pure de - ligb%,Wierc saints im -
There is a land of- pure de- JigisWhere saint- im -
. . r r ! r- r r r
I I "
moor -tal- reign; In -fin -ite, day ex - ludes the
T
saor-ta]l reign; In fm i- ite, day ex eludes the
ft-~~ is FA.F- F
13206-4
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S
night, And- pleas - ures ban - ish- pain.
A
night, And pleas - ures ban - ish pain.
soft
nigh, And- pleas - ures ban - ish pain. Sweet fields be -
soft
night, And- pleas- ures ban - ish pain. Sweet fields be -
Iv * i' l 1. I I I
yond the., swell - ing flood, Stand dressed in- li - ing green;
-" - , - - .. r ; r4LL
yond the- swell - ing. flood, Stand dressed in- liv - ing green;-
1 I , , , I J4J J I - I J I I
13206-4
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r, 14' loud
So to the Jews old Ca - nann- stoodWhile Jor - dan
/1 '14 loud
" ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.. .. d '1I:-' 7,
So to the Jews old Ca-na"a stood,While Jor - dan-
A a 0 loud
So to the Jews old Ca-naan stoodWhile Jor- dan
loud
- So to the Jews old Ca- naan- stoodWhile Jor - dan.
J .J .
rolled be -tween. 80fif
rolled be -tween. Setfed e-yn h- sel-igr r * /i i -B ' F'
rolled be - tween. Sweet fields be - yond the swell - ing.
SF I Fr s oft
1 j320.6-4 -
13206-4






flood, Stand dressed i. liv - ing green; So to tie
.. .. .. ---- loud
flood, Stand dressed in- liv - ing green;- So to the
J F ' .
Jews old Ca - nan stoodWlile bor -clan- rolled be- tween.
A -a--
Jews old Ca - na stoodVWbie Jor -dan- rolled be -tween.
Jews old Ca - an stood, While Jor- dn- rolled be - tween.
Jews old Ca - oan stood, While Jor - dan rolled be - tween.:._ . ? J ~ I- ,= , i: : , r :- # I" : .
A A I.l, t , . -" , . .1 I . I ..
-/ ; [ l I1 I I f 1 .I I rJ :
- " ' ! ! . . . : ' : .. - ' J I -
13206-4
From WVillam Billizs-The Suffolk Harmony- (Bozom. 1786)
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S Hal-le-lo-Ah.A-men, Amen,Halle. In - jA,A -
Hal-le-lu -jab, A-men, Amen. Halle - lu .jah,A .
H l- u- ahAmcn, Amengal- lu-jzkA - =n,
Hal- le-lu-ja, Amen, Amen, Halle- la-ja, A - men,
T:o solo
LL S$S6







Halle -ln -jab,A-men, A-menHa-le -lu-jah, X men A - men, - men, Hal-
Hall - lu -ja, A-men, A-menHa-le- lu-ja, A - men, A - nen, A - men, Hal-
A.I
men, Hal-Ia-lu - jah,._ Hal--le-u-jahHal - le - lu - jali-Hal - l - lu-jahi.7 I- l-
men! Hal-le- lu ja,. Hal-le- lu-ja, Hal- le - la- ja, Hal - le - lu-ia,t Hal-
T. 9 a99 9 n 994a9
men, Hal-le- lu-jah,Hal-le - lu-jab, Hal-le - lu - jab, Hal-le - Iu- jab. Ial-
men!Htal-e-lu-ja,Hal-le - lu-ja, aal-le lu -ja. H l-le . j4, Hal-
.(tti). t -* A * A . .
B.
Hal-Ic-lu-jah, A-mcn. A-mcn,Hal-lc-lu-jah, Hal- le - Iu-jah, Hal-
Hal-le-lu-j , A-men, A-men Hal-le-lu-ja, Hal - le - la-ja. Hal -
B.C. g C




VI.I . r e r [ 7 ' - i i ; J  i I L
VIa.
S.
le - lu - jab, Hal - le - lu-jah, Hal - le - - - lu - jab, Hal-lc-lu- jah, A-mcn,
le - lu - ja, Hal - le - lu-ja, Hal - le - - - lu - ja, Hal-le-lu- ja. A-men,
A. w; t
IH- lu - jabI, Ha - e-lu -jakA-men, A-menHalle-lu-jah.A- men.
Ic - t - ja, Ha- le-lu - ja, A-men, A-menHale-lu-ja, A - men!
T. 8 1 , _ [ J , -1. Hal -,/ "; F
Ic - lu-a . Hal - I-lu - jab, Hal le -lu -jahA-men,
le - lu-Ja_, . Hal - le-lu - ja, Hal - le-lu-ja, A-men,
B.
le - Ia-jah, Hal -Ic- In -jab.A-men, AmnenHal-lc- lu-jah, A- men,
le - lu-ja, Hal - fe-lu - ja. A-men, Amen,HIal-fe-lu-ja, A - men,
B.C. K _9 r r b
7 6
MOM5a
- -- I?. -~1. .1 1





I I F i a,
Via. r-
S.r
AmeH tllelu-jah,A - men. 0 lu - dah,re-joice, re-joice, - re-joie e,- O
Amen!Ha elu-ja, A - men! Mischt euch, fhr Reih'n, mchtcuch,..Ihr-Relh'n, in un - re
A. -J
O Ju - dahe-joice, re-joice, re - joice, re-joicc, 0
Mischt euch, fhr Reih'n. mkcht euch, ihr Reth'n, In urn - re
T.
AmnjeHallclu-jab,x - men. 0 Ju - dah re-joice, re joice, re joice,.. 0
Amn!NaUe4u-ja, A - ,nMischt euch; Mhr Reih'n; mfsleuch,,,. . I ehrc'n, In urn - re
B4L
0 Ju - dahre-joice, re-joice. re.joicc_, 0
Mrichi euch, thr Reih'n, mint euc.h,: Rlt h 'Re~n, In urn . r
B.C. '11 1
T.L. L - .I ". I 4 "J '
II'r I : J 2 , I i , , . ..
lu-dab, in a ga di - vie, WithCbez-u-bin and Set- n-phin,har.rno - - nfoua
C1Z8-re. inischt cuch, f~r Rcteh'n dcc Che-ra. bum end Se. c a .phm, hac- mo .- nlsch
A.
S Ju-dah, in scega di - vine, Wtlerf- anid Sec- a-pbin,har-mo - -ni|o,Ti. C Ju- dab, n ecnga d r ieh'n tier .ru-btnm nd Se - a-pi ha--mo .4.n&A
Ozh -rc, mit each, Ihr R-elA'n dcr Ohc-ru-blm end Sc- a- trm,Aar-ro . . ni€AS.
Ju- di, in ;&gs di- vine,
Ch5-re, ,i cht euch, Lfr Redhl'n
B.C.
E.SSS6
1J *)1 - -1 p , I i
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APPENDIX C2: "HALLELUJAH, AMEN" ("COPYRIGHTED" VERSION)
" ifed by Norwood Hinkle GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL(1185-171 )





A e a' +-- II. to-
A A
.. 3 "_,i - # • , . .
-,~ , -' / i
Hal - In-lu - ja A- men, A-men,Hal- e. lu- jai, A -
Hal-e-Lu -IjatA men,
Hal-le. lu - jai, A-men, A-men,Hal-le- lu-ja, A - menHa, e- lu - ja .
Hil-le- lu - jAi, A-m,, A-men,HaIl-'e-lu-jah, A - menlHal-. -u jaiHal-le-
men. Hal- It - lu - jah, A-men,
A_=eniW!e. a A - men, A - , A A - men, Hal-
- Hal-It- u-jahiHaI - le- lu - jab,Hal . e- Inb - ja, W Hal-
lu-jahl, Hal-le - L-jah, H . le - lu- jan, Hal-
A-men)Hal-le- lu-jah,Hal e - lu - jah, Hal -
M~ 14.570 cysft Ktcixfl b7 Oltyw Mum aga C7mp8-12
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- le -
-- 'lu-
ic- lu -ja,, Ha , l.ja, Hal le iu -
.. jab, Hal - Ielu - jab A-men, A-men,a 1e- lu jah, A
le lu ja ,.. Hal - Ie-lu - jab,
. .=. - 14
le - lu-jah, Hal - Ie-lu - jah, A-men, A -men,Hal- le- lu- jah, A -
r FP
jab, Hal- ie - Iu - jab, A-men, A-men,Hal- le- lu-jab, A - men;0 - Ju- dah, re-
a
men,
Hal - e-- jab, A-men, A-men,Hal-Ie- lu-jab, A - men; 0 Ju- dab, re -
N mens
joice, re-joice, Re-joice,. 0. Ju- dab, in song di-
4. •t A_ a. - . , ., it ._.
I I
uVne, Wjth het- u - bim and se- ajhim bar-mo cen, join Wii ciet- b-i andjoc, jicL JR-jice. O u . i eg i
I r
Pr "I
vine, Witli char- u -bIm and act- afbim hat-mo - ons Join, With cier- u-bim and
il
